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ABSTRACT 
Recognizing the cultural background of a defendant who belongs 
to a minority culture is known as “cultural defense,” meaning that the 
minority member’s cultural background is accepted as a form of 
“defense” in a criminal trial. In general, the term “defense” is not 
only applicable in the functional sense as a formal defense against 
criminal liability, but rather can be applied in its literal linguistic 
sense, meaning that the defendant’s cultural background may grant 
them different types of special considerations during the criminal 
procedure. 
This article aims to examine several legal models for the 
recognition of the cultural background of defendants belonging to 
minority groups during the criminal procedure. The first chapter 
(constituting the foundation for the discussion of the proposed legal 
models in the second chapter) discusses the justification for 
considering a defendant’s culture during the criminal process, 
including discussion of the principle of culpability, the doctrine of 
equality, the right to culture, and the promotion of pluralism in 
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criminal law. The second chapter examines four possible models for 
the recognition of a defendant’s culture in a criminal trial: the 
“complete cultural defense model,” the “integrative model,” the 
“punishment model,” and the “disregarding model.” Although the last 
model advocates that there should be no recognition of the defendant’s 
culture during a criminal trial, the common denominator of the other 
three models is that they all recognize the defendant’s culture, at 
different stages of the criminal trial. The “complete cultural defense 
model” recognizes the defendant’s culture as an additional formal 
defense against criminal liability; the “integrated model” recognizes 
the inclusion of cultural arguments as part of the existing set of 
defenses against criminal liability, and the “punishment model” 
recognizes the defendant’s culture as a mitigating factor in sentencing. 
Examination of the disadvantages and advantages of each model leads 
to the conclusion that the solution for the thesis discussed in this article 
necessitates the synthesis of several models to form a new “relative 
normative model.” 
INTRODUCTION 
The term “culture” was first applied and broadly defined in the 
field of anthropology towards the end of the nineteenth century by Sir 
Edward Burnet Tylor (1871) as “that complex whole, which includes 
knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities 
and habits acquired by man as a member of society.”1 Later definitions 
of the term tended to draw a clear distinction between behavioral 
practices and values, the arts, and abstract perceptions of the world 
underlying this behavior.2 In other words, culture is not just the visible 
behavior, but the shared ideals, beliefs, and values through which 
humans interpret their experiences that are reflected in their behavior.3 
The main core value of Liberalism is the individual’s autonomous right 
                                                                                                       
 1. Edward B. Tylor, Primitive Culture (4th ed.1903). 
 2. William Haviland, for example, defined the term ‘culture’ as “a set of rules or 
values, that, when acted upon by members of a particular society, produce behavior 
that falls within a range of variance the members consider proper and acceptable.” See 
William Haviland, Cultural Anthropology 49-50 (8th ed.1999). A similar definition is 
given by Robert Levine who defined the term ‘culture’ as: “A shared organization of 
ideas that includes the intellectual, moral, and aesthetic standards prevalent in a 
community and the meanings of communicative actions.” Robert Levine, Properties of 
Culture: An Ethnographic Vview, in Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self, and 
Emotion 67, 67 (Richard A. Shweder & Robert A. LeVine eds., 1984). 
 3. Haviland, supra note 2. 
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to shape their life independently and according to their choice. 4 
According to Will Kymlicha and Joseph Raz, the role of culture is to 
provide a reservoir of choices that people can use to realize their 
autonomy.5 Avishay Margalit and Moshe Halbertal assert that culture 
can shape a person’s identity.6 It is in the interest of each person that 
they be allowed to continue to follow the culture that has formed their 
personality and consciousness and their daily life practices.7 Defense of 
their culture actually represents the defense of the important values that 
constitute the core of their identity. 
Each cultural group has its own unique lifestyle, rich in 
distinctive cultural customs, practices, beliefs, and meanings. Culture 
shapes the beliefs, behavior, and consciousness of each of the group’s 
members. It equips its members with a basic cognitive and ethical 
perception of the world from early childhood, and helps the individual 
understand her position in the world.8 This process, transmitting a 
culture from generation to generation, is known as “enculturation.” 
Through enculturation, the culture’s standards and meanings are 
internalized and assimilated as part of the individual’s personality so 
that the culture actually shapes personality and becomes a significant 
factor influencing the way a person behaves. 9  The enculturation 
process in general, especially the influence of cultural background on 
the way an individual thinks and acts, constitutes the basis for 
recognizing the doctrine of “cultural defense.” It is also the foundation 
for the thesis of the present article: In certain circumstances it is 
possible and appropriate to consider the cultural background of a 
defendant who belongs to a cultural minority within the framework of 
criminal proceedings. 
                                                                                                       
 4. MENACHEM Mautner, Law and Culture in Israel at the Threshold of the Twenty 
First Century 370 (2008) (in Hebrew). 
 5. See generally Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An 
Introduction 339 (2d ed.2002); Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 400-29 (1986); 
Joseph Raz, Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective, in Ethics in the Public Domain: 
Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics 155, 155-76 (1994); Will Kymlicka, 
Liberalism, Community, and Culture 164-65 (1989); Will Kymlicka, Multicultural 
Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights 82-84 (1995). 
 6. Avishay Margalit & Moshe Halbertal, Liberalism and The Right to Culture, in 
Thoughts on Multiculturalism: Multiculturalism in a Democratic and Jewish State 97 
(Menachem Mautner et al. eds., 1998) (in Hebrew). 
 7. Mautner, supra note 4. 
 8. Mautner and Sagi, Thoughts on Multiculturalism, supra note 6, at 67. 
 9. Alison Dundes Renteln, The Cultural Defense 12 (2004). 
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FIRST CHAPTER: DISCUSSION OF THE JUSTIFICATION FOR 
RECOGNITION OF CULTURAL BACKROUND IN CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDINGS 
This chapter discusses the justification for the recognition of a 
defendant’s culture during criminal proceedings. The conclusions from 
this chapter constitute the basis and principal building blocks for the 
discussion in the second chapter of the article concerning possible 
models for the recognition of the defendant’s culture. 
1. The Principle of Culpability 
The main reason that “cultural defense” should be recognized in a 
criminal trial relates to the principle of culpability. Some legal scholars 
assert that the criminal defendant who acts according to a particular 
cultural dictate is relatively less culpable than the defendant who 
committed the same act, without the influence of any particular cultural 
background. In a case where the extent of culpability is diminished due 
to cultural argument, this must be reflected (1) in determining whether 
and to what extent criminal responsibility exists or (2) as a mitigating 
factor in sentencing. 
The principle of culpability is a fundamental principle in criminal 
law.10 According to this principle, there is no crime without culpability 
(nullum crimen sine culpa).11 Modern codes typically follow the Model 
Penal Code section 2.02(1), which provides that “a person is not guilty 
of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or 
negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material 
element of the offense.” The comments to the Model Penal Code note 
that the “demand for culpability is articulated in the Code’s insistence 
that an element of culpability is requisite for any valid criminal 
conviction.”12 Paul Robinson recognizes that the provision reflects the 
“criminal law’s commitment to requiring not only a breach of society’s 
                                                                                                       
 10. See Mordechai Kremnitzer, Justified Deviations from the Principle of 
Culpability, 13 Bar-Ilan L. Rev. 109, (1996) (in Hebrew); Sh. Z. Feller, Criminal Law 
Basics, 39-44 (1984) (in Hebrew). 
 11. See generally Francis Bowes Sayre, The Present Significance of Mens Rea in 
the Criminal Law, in Harv. Legal Essays 399 (1934); see also Paul H. Robinson & 
Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code 
and Beyond, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 681, 687 (1983). 
 12. Model Penal Code § 2.02(1), explanatory note (1985). “The only exception to 
this general requirement is the narrow allowance for offenses of strict liability in 
Section 2.05, limited to cases where no severer sentence than a fine may be imposed.” 
Id. 
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objective rules of conduct, but also an actor’s culpability as to the 
conditions that make the conduct a breach.”13 Robinson notes that 
“without mens rea, there is little justification for condemning or 
punishing an actor. Without culpability in the actor, causing the injury 
may be seen as lacking in sufficient blameworthiness to deserve the 
condemnation and probation of criminal conviction.”14 
Culpability also significantly influences society’s perception of 
the severity of a crime that has been committed, or in other words, the 
perceived severity of a crime that has been committed. According to 
this principle, no criminal responsibility or punishment should be 
imposed on a person beyond the extent of their culpability. In general, 
diminished culpability evokes a relatively milder social reaction as 
compared to a similar case with a higher level of culpability. For 
example, in homicide cases, the different levels of culpability 
(premeditation, negligence or recklessness) produce different social 
reactions regarding punishment. 
When a member of a cultural minority commits a criminal act 
which is the product of a cultural dictate or practice, this person is 
generally criminally responsible for the act because he or she 
conducted the act out of “free will.” However, the enculturation 
process may restrict the minority defendant’s ability to choose an 
acceptable course of action. This is because the enculturated minority 
defendant can only choose between a limited number of alternatives 
offered by the culture. In such cases, although the defendant may have 
acted out of “free will,” it can be argued that the defendant’s choice 
was not the result of free rational decision making. Therefore, the 
defendant’s cultural background may influence the extent of their 
culpability, insofar as the criminal act is the result of the influence of 
their cultural background. 
An inseparable part of determining the culpability of a 
defendant—who committed a criminal act according to a traditional 
cultural practice—is to uncover the special meaning a particular culture 
attributes to its cultural practices.15 The justification for considering the 
defendant’s enculturation, according to this argument, stems from the 
concern that the liberal state (the legislator, courts, and public 
prosecutor) may not correctly interpret the meaning given to the 
                                                                                                       
 13. Paul R. Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law 207 (1997). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Mautner, supra note 4, at 376-79. 
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cultural practice. 16  Each practice has meaning, and the authentic 
meaning of the cultural practices in which people participate may be 
different from the meaning attributed to those practices from a liberal 
viewpoint.17 A court must first understand the meaning of the cultural 
practice before it can correctly assess a criminal act that stems from the 
practice. In other words, a court needs to understand the defendant’s 
“cultural language.” Cultural language is a constituent language18 that 
directs the individual to behave in a certain manner; the comprehension 
of cultural narratives is a necessary precondition for the correct 
interpretation and evaluation of the defendant’s act. 
For example, in State v. Kargar, the defendant—who emigrated 
to the United States from Afghanistan—was indicted for federal crimes 
relating to sexual assault of a minor because he had kissed his baby 
son’s genitals.19 The defendant explained that the act constituted an 
expression of affection towards the child without any sexual 
connotation. The fact that the defendant was indicted for such an act, 
and was even convicted in the first instance, reflects that the prosecutor 
and the court misinterpreted the meaning of the act. The gap between 
the court’s “liberal interpretation” and the Afghani “cultural 
interpretation” of the act, led to the unjust or disproportionate 
imposition of culpability and disgrace on the defendant. 
An additional example is the practice of “female circumcision.” 
Western feminists have fought the practice of female circumcision 
because they see it as a male means to “police” and subjugate women’s	  
sexuality. In contrast, feminists from the third world and other authors 
have have argued that Western feminists do not understand the 
significance of “women’s circumcision” in the context of the cultures 
that engage in the practice. 20  These critics claim that “female 
                                                                                                       
 16. Id.; see generally Erin R. Melnick, Note, Reaffirming No-Fault Divorce: 
Supplementing Formal Equality with Substantive Change 75 Ind. L.J. 711 (2000); 
Homi K. Bhaba, Liberalism’s Sacred Cow, in Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? 79, 
81 (Joshua Cohen, et al. eds., 1999); John Frow, Economies of Value, in 
Multiculturalism States 53 (David Bennett ed., 1998). 
 17. Mautner, supra note 4, at 376, 384. 
 18. Gershon Gontovnik, The Right to Culture in a Liberal Society and in the State 
of Israel, 27 Tel Aviv L. Rev. 23, 28 (2003) (in Hebrew). 
 19. 679 A.2d 81 (Me. 1996) (hereinafter “Kargar”). For a more detailed explanation 
of the Kargar case, see generally Nancy A. Wanderer & Catherine R. Connors, Culture 
and Crime: Kargar and the Existing Framework for a Cultural Defense, 47 Buff. L. 
Rev. 829 (1999). 
 20. See Mautner,, supra note 4, at 377-79; Bettina Shell-Duncan & Ylva Herlund, 
Dimensions of the Practice and Debates, in Female “Circumcision” in Africa 1, 1-19 
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circumcision” improves hygiene and health, contributes to fertility, and 
establishes feminine identity. Further, proponents of female 
circumcision claim that it is a sign of courage for a woman to endure 
much suffering; it reinforces her ability to withstand the tribulations of 
life and also indicates her membership of a higher social echelon in her 
society.21 
According to Menachem Mautner, Liberalists tends to interpret 
the practice of “female circumcision” as an expression of suppressing 
female sexuality. However, in the groups where it exists the practice 
has many varied meanings, most of which are unconnected with sexual 
suppression by men. Instead, the practice is associated with values 
considered respectable in liberal cultures (i.e. courage, ability to 
withstand suffering, and camaraderie). Exposure to the meaning of the 
practice, in the eyes of those who practice it, reflects on the perception 
of culpability of the accused. In cases where a criminal act is the result 
of a cultural dictate or practice for which a defendant’s culture has 
ascribed a positive meaning, the minority defendant appears less 
culpable than other defendants in general. 
One of the arguments against the recognition of “cultural 
defense” is that considering the defendant’s culture in a criminal trial 
will undermine the principle of public deterrence because people will 
not be deterred from performing the same or similar acts.22 Further, 
because the accused would be absolved of her act(s), she would also be 
undeterred from similar conduct in the future. However, it should be 
remembered that society’s need for deterrence cannot justify 
convicting someone who is not culpable. Moreover, general deterrence 
(deterrence of the public) cannot justify a more severe punishment than 
would be proper to impose on a defendant based on that defendant’s 
level of culpability. Imposing punishment beyond what is appropriate 
                                                                                                       
(Bettina Shell-Duncan & Ylva Hernlund, eds., 2000); Richard A Shweder, “What 
About Female Genital Mutilation?” and Why Understanding Culture Matters in the 
First Place, in Engaging Cultural Differences: The Multiculturalism Challenge in 
Liberal Democracies 216, 220 (Richard A. Shweder et al. eds.,  2002;(  Naomi 
Mendelsohn, Note, At the Crossroads: The Case For and Against a Cultural Defense 
to Female Genital Mutilation, 56 Rutgers L. Rev. 1011, 1031 (2004); Nancy 
Ehrenreich & Mark Barr, Intersex Surgery, Female Genital Cutting, and the Selective 
Condemnation of “Cultural Practices”, 40 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 71, 71 (2005); 
Holly Maguigan, Will Prosecutions for “Female Genital Mutilation” Stop the Practice 
in the U.S.?, 8 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 391, 391-93 (1999). 
 21. Mautner, supra note 4, at 377-79. 
 22. Valerie L. Sacks, An Indefensible Defense: On The Misuse of Culture in 
Criminal Law, 13 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 523, 541 (1996). 
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for the criminal’s culpability, in order to deter others, would be 
exploitative. 
2. The Doctrine of Equality 
One argument against recognizing a defendant’s culture in a 
criminal trial is that it undermines the doctrine of equality.23 The 
message conveyed by the doctrine of equality is that everyone is equal 
before the law. “Cultural defense” may offend the principle of equality 
because it differentiates between defendants belonging to minority 
cultures and those of the majority culture, giving the minority 
defendant certain protection not afforded to most citizens. The 
argument here is that the law should pardon everyone equally—any 
other application would be impermissibly arbitrary and discriminatory. 
The doctrine of equality is interpreted in two ways: formal 
equality and substantive equality. Formal equality means “equal 
treatment for all,”24 while substantive equality aspires to attain just 
results, that is, equality of results. According to substantive equality, 
when examining whether a particular situation is unequal, it is 
necessary to determine whether the results are equal.25 Thus, when 
claiming wrongful discrimination, it is insufficient to argue that the 
criminal law treats cultural minorities differently. It must be 
demonstrated that people who share the same relevant characteristics 
are treated differently and that the different treatment stems from 
improper reasons. In this situation, where the accused’s cultural 
backround is a relevant circumstance, considering it should not be 
regarded as wrongful discrimination, but as an acceptable distinction.26 
                                                                                                       
 23. Id. at 542-44. 
 24. For example, when admission requirements for law school at a university are 
the same for everyone, the academic institution acts according to the principle of 
formal equality. 
 25. The notion of substantive equality has weaved its way through the feminist 
movement because the promises of formal equality failed to realize the goals of 
feminist reformers. See Melnick, supra note 16, at 711; see generally Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Some Reflections on the Feminist Legal Thought of the 1970s, 1989 U. Chi. 
Legal F. 9 (1989) 
 26. It was well described by Judge Theodor Or in the case of Avitan: “It is not the 
‘technical’ or ‘formal’ equality which is worthy of protection, but substantive equality, 
that is equality among equals. Persons, or groups of people, often differ one from the 
other, in their circumstances, characteristics and needs, and sometimes it is necessary 
to discriminate between those who are not equal in order to protect the weak or needy, 
and encourage them. Therefore, the question is not only whether a person is 
discriminated against in relation to another, but it must also be discovered whether the 
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Some scholars may argue that a “cultural defense” will create 
different standards for different groups,27 casting doubt that the results 
are just. Because any group could arbitrarily decide which standards it 
consents to obey and which it ignores, a “cultural defense” may 
undermine public order and even lead to anarchy. However, this 
argument would only be correct if a “cultural defense” existed that 
pardoned members of minority cultures in a sweeping unconditional 
manner. Obviously, there are clearly defined conditions for applying 
each criminal defense, such that the law will not pardon behavior that 
harms important public values or interests. Moreover, a “cultural 
defense” does not create different standards of behavior. Such 
standards exist by virtue of cultural diversity. A “cultural defense” 
takes such existing cultural difference into consideration and 
recognizes those standards.  “Cultural defense” is, therefore, in line 
with the doctrine of substantive equality and cannot be considered as 
wrongful discrimination. 
Further criticism that the law is not applied equally and does not 
pretend to be so, is heard from the Critical Legal Studies movement. 
According to this movement, courts reflect the values and ideology of 
the powerful members of society and serve the interests of those 
members alone.28 To retain the elite in its privileged position, to 
prevent radical changes, and protect the status quo, the law plays a 
particular role in maintaining social, financial, and political inequality 
by acting only for those who are strong.29 If the majority is powerful 
and the law represents those with power, then the values protected by 
the law are the values that those with power wish to protect. 
Two conclusions can be deduced: first, the fact that there is not a 
formal “cultural defense” in existing legal systems is, inter alia, the 
result of the legal subjugation and weakness of cultural minorities, 
which is in turn the result of their political subjugation and weakness. 
                                                                                                       
discrimination is unjustified. The distinction between different parties, however, does 
not constitute discrimination.” Avitan v. Israel Lands Administration, 43(4) PADI 297, 
299 (1989). 
 27. James G. Connell, III & Rene L. Valladares, Cultural Issues in Criminal 
Defenses, 7.41-7.43 (Juris Publishing 2003). 
 28. Omer Shapira, Jurisprudence 435-436 (2007) (in Hebrew). For the history of 
the Critical Legal Studies, see generally John Henry Schlegel, Notes Toward an 
Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the Conference on Critical Legal 
Studies, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 391, 400-03 (1984); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A 
Political History, 100 Yale L.J. 1515 (1991). 
 29. Shapira, supra note 28, at 428-29. 
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Second, the values of minority cultures will not be granted protection 
and will not be promoted in any fashion so long as those cultures do 
not possess political and legal power. 
An additional argument asserted by the Critical Legal Studies 
movement is that the law has a calming effect, which generates 
stagnation and hinders change.30 According to Omer Shapira, legal 
discourse relating to rights and duties—which involve the weighing 
and balancing of different interests and juridical decisions—conveys a 
calming message to the entire community that the situation is as it 
should be. This process spreads a message that there is no need for 
change and that there are no genuine better alternatives. Consequently, 
greater social involvement in decision-making is avoided. Instead of 
taking the initiative and more actively participating in the decision-
making process, citizens leave decisions concerning policy on social 
issues to politicians (the legislator) and courts, so that those who make 
the decisions gain the upper hand.31 This phenomenon is expressed in 
criminal procedure when a defendant who belongs to a minority culture 
commits a criminal act in accordance with the ethics and dictates of 
their culture. In this situation, the legal system assesses this act 
according to the accepted rules, applying existing objective doctrines 
(such as “the reasonable man”), while disregarding the need to apply 
specialized consideration in the particular case according to the 
defendant’s cultural background. This situation is an expression of 
inequality that may lead to unjust results. 
To conclude, the doctrine of equality constitutes a double-edged 
sword in relation to “cultural defense.” The doctrine requires equality 
before the law so that everyone must obey its stipulations without 
distinction. However, in an unequal social and legal reality, a “cultural 
defense”actually promotes the equality of the cultural minority 
defendant. 
3. The Right to Culture 
The “right to culture” is founded on the perception that culture is 
an all-encompassing lifestyle that covers all aspects of human 
existence.32 This right is granted at three levels.33 The first level is the 
individual’s right to live according to her own culture without 
                                                                                                       
 30. Id. at 429-30. 
 31. Id. at 430. 
 32. Margalit & Halbertal, supra note 6, at 97. 
 33. Id. at 97-98. 
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interference from broader society—with the single restriction that she 
does not harm others. The second level includes the first level in 
addition to right for the cultural community’s lifestyle to be recognized 
alongside the general society. The third level includes the previous two 
levels plus the right to receive support for the particular lifestyle from 
state institutions so that the culture may prosper. 
In line with liberal values, Will Kymlicha (“Kymlicka”) derives 
the right to culture from the right to liberty. According to Kymlicka, 
liberty includes being able to make choices from a variety of 
alternatives, and the individual’s culture not only provides these 
alternatives but also gives them meaning.34 The individual’s choices 
depend upon and are linked to the cultural context. In other words, the 
value of “cultural affiliation” is derived from a higher primary value: 
liberty. In contrast to Kymlicha, Margalit and Halbertal assert that the 
right to culture stems from the right to an identity. The significance of 
an individual’s identity is evidenced by the supreme importance that 
the individual attributes to maintaining a lifestyle acceptable to her. 
This includes the right to adopt what the individual considers—in her 
own view and that of her cultural group—are the identifying features 
of her culture.35 Unlike Kymlicha, who sees the role of culture as 
providing a choice between alternatives, Margalit and Halbertal 
suggest that a particular culture is cherished by its members because it 
provides their lives with profound significance—not because it can 
offer a choice of alternatives. 
Regardless of whether it is derived from the right to liberty or the 
right to an identity, the right to culture, like any right, imposes a duty. 
In this case, the right to culture imposes a duty on the liberal state to 
allow minority cultures to act according to their cultural traditions. The 
United Nations has recognized this right in clause 27 of International 
Covenant on Civil and Policy Rights (ICCPR): 
In those states in which ethnic, religious, or linguistic 
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities 
shall not be denied the right, in community with other 
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to 
profess and practice their own religion, or to use their 
                                                                                                       
 34. See Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 223-29 (1985); see also Kymlicka, 
Contemporary Political Philosophy, supra note 5, at 339; Kymlicka, Liberalism, 
Community and Culture, supra note 5. 
 35. Margalit & Halbertal, supra note 6, at 100. 
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own language.36 
Although an individual may have a right to culture in 
international law, the recognition of this right in the criminal justice 
domain has engendered dilemmas. First, to what extent, if at all, should 
the right to culture be superseded when it conflicts with other rights 
and values? What is the relative weight of the right to culture when it is 
set against other human rights? Which cultural traditions should be 
protected? To answer these questions, a distinction should be drawn 
between accepted cultural traditions (practices) and those which are not 
accepted. In order to draw this distinction, we need different 
approaches for determining when to recognize cultural traditions. 
Sebastian Poulter relies on the standard of human rights to 
determine when a cultural tradition should be allowed.37  For Poulter, a 
cultural tradition that transgresses human rights should be restricted. If 
it does not transgress any human right then it should be allowed. 
Alison Renteln criticizes this approach, pointing out that the right to 
culture can itself be seen as a human right. 38  In fact, Poulter’s 
position—that tradition should be restricted in cases where there is a 
clash between cultural tradition and any human right—assumes that 
cultural rights are on a lower level of values than other human rights. 
Renteln does not accept this assumption because human rights are 
culturally neutral; moreover clause 27 of the ICCPR does not stipulate 
that the right to culture is subordinate to other human rights.39 An 
additional reason to resist Poulter’s approach is that universal 
principles are by nature open to many interpretations and meanings; 
they are subject to disagreement; they are ambiguous and insufficiently 
clear to grant them the significant power of restricting cultural 
traditions. 
Renteln suggests a different approach to determine when to allow 
or disallow the existence of cultural tradition.  For Renteln, the right to 
culture should be restricted when it engenders “irreparable physical 
harm.” 40  For Parekh Bhikku, it should be restricted whenever it 
                                                                                                       
 36. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. res. 
2200A (XXI), ¶ 27, (Mar. 23, 1976). 
 37. See Sebastian Poulter, Ethnic Minority Customs, English Law and Human 
Rights, 36 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 589-615 (1987) cited with approval in Renteln, supra 
note 9, at 215. 
 38. Renteln, supra note 9, at 215. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 217. 
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conflicts with an “operative societal value.” 41  Renteln criticizes 
Bhikku’s approach on the ground that not all traditions which 
contradict operative social values cause damage, and as for those 
traditions, there is no need to restrict them.42 A relevant example is 
polygamy. According to Bhikku, polygamy clashes with the value of 
equality between the sexes, and should therefore not be allowed. In 
contrast, Renteln would argue that since polygamy does not cause 
irreversible damage, it should therefore be permitted. 
However, even Renteln’s approach is not without its difficulties. 
The main difficulty is the definition of “damage” varies between 
communities. The fact that the majority group considers that a 
particular practice of a minority cultural group causes damage does not 
mean that members of that culture would see the practice as damaging. 
For example, Western cultures consider that “female circumcision” 
causes irreversible physical damage to the woman’s sexual organs. In 
contrast, members of the cultures that perform the ritual consider any 
such “damage” acceptable because the practice improves several 
aspects of the condition of those who are circumcised. 
Similarly, Western culture sees the practice of “coining”—
treating influenza in children by rubbing a hot coin on the body of the 
child—as damaging to the child because it leaves temporary bruising 
that passes with time. However, those who perform the practice do not 
consider the temporary bruising as damage, but rather a means for 
healing. Likewise, scarring is a practice used in some cultures as a 
means of beautification and to indicate that the child belongs to a 
particular tribe—and it is not seen as “damage” by the cultural 
members (like the way it is seen by the majority population). 
To summarize, it can be argued that the right to culture is a 
principle that supports consideration of the defendant’s culture. 
However, the right to culture—like any right—is relative (and not 
absolute). Therefore, it should be weighed in relation to other rights, 
interests, and values. I opine that it is doubtful whether the right to 
culture can have the upper hand in the face of more “eminent” rights 
and values protected by the criminal law such as the sanctity of life, 
respect for one’s fellow man, and the individual’s right to bodily 
integrity. Therefore, although the right to culture constitutes an 
additional reason for recognizing a defendant’s culture during criminal 
                                                                                                       
 41. See Bhikhu Parekh, Minority Practices and Principles of Toleration, 30 Int’l 
Migration Rev. 251, 251-84 (2000), questioned in Renteln, supra note 9, at 217. 
 42. Renteln, supra note 9, at 216-217. 
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proceedings, it cannot by itself justify such recognition. 
 
4. Promoting Cultural Pluralism in Criminal Law 
The term “cultural pluralism” describes a situation in which small 
groups coexisting within a larger society maintain their unique 
identities. In a pluralistic society, these minority groups are considered 
valuable for the dominant cultures.43 Those who advocate the adoption 
of “cultural defense” within the legal system claim, inter alia, that 
“cultural defense” constitutes a means to support and promote the 
value of “cultural pluralism.” 44  Liberal society is committed to 
“cultural pluralism” for a number of reasons.45 One reason stems from 
the perception that pluralism maintains social vivacity, so that 
absorption of cultural elements from a broad spectrum of ethnic groups 
contributes to the dynamism and development of society as a whole. 
The second reason is that “cultural pluralism” is the product of the 
doctrine of equality. Maintaining equality between different ethnic 
groups requires that each group respect the right of the other groups to 
be different; the majority cannot punish the minority group just 
because it is different.46 The third reason that “cultural pluralism” 
should be encouraged is because it reflects the majority’s confirmation 
of the importance of “liberty.” 
Cultural pluralism is an inevitable product of a democratic 
society’s commitment to liberty. If a multicultural state premits its 
citizens to live according to their traditional values, this should lead to 
a culturally pluralistic society. Commitment to a pluralistic policy 
helps to sustain different cultural identities because important ethnic 
values are maintained. Cultural identity is the main core of an 
individual’s identity: it provides a fundamental component of an 
individual’s self-definition and boosts confidence in the individual’s 
affiliations. Thus, the promotion of cultural pluralism sustains the 
personal identity of minority group members and also the cultural 
identity of the minority group as a whole. 
                                                                                                       
 43. Nationamaster.com, available at,  
http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Cultural-pluralism (last visited Nov. 5, 
2011). 
 44. Pieter A. Carstens, The Cultural Defense in The Criminal Law, 99 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1293, 1300 (1986). 
 45. Id. at 1300-07. 
 46. Id. at 1301. 
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Yet another reason to promote cultural pluralism is that the 
respect of the majority for the values of the minority facilitates the 
adaptation of the minority to the majority culture. Nevertheless, there 
may be a fear that “cultural defense” will actually lead to the isolation 
and empowerment of the minority cultural community at the expense 
of the individual’s autonomy, and engender a sense of lack of 
protection for potential victims of the culture. 
An additional argument that supports cultural pluralism is that 
ignoring the minority culture would be perceived as contempt for the 
minority values, engendering alienation and conflict between different 
groups. At least one commentator argues that “cultural defense” is 
necessary in a pluralistic society in order to protect different beliefs 
and practices from vilification, slander, and condemnation.47 This is 
correct with regard to “liberal” practices that do not transgress values 
protected by the criminal law. However, when harmful practices are 
involved, this reasoning is weakened. 
Post-modernist theories support the perception that the law, as it 
exists, is the product of the specific thoughts and “voices” of those who 
drafted it. 48 Scholars who espouse the Critical Approach to Law, 
Critical Race Theories, and Feminist Legal Theory claim that 
throughout history, American law has been directed by the “voice” of 
the white American male. 49  Some of the proponents of these 
approaches have asserted that the criminal law should be pluralistic (or 
more pluralistic than it is today), meaning that the criminal procedure 
should more accurately reflect the variety of voices present in society.50 
They argue that without such a change it will be impossible to ensure 
the fairness and justice that constitute fundamental principles of the 
modern liberal approach. 51  Liberals, who support the concept of 
                                                                                                       
 47. Alec Samuels, Legal Recognition and Provocation of Minority Customs in a 
Plural Society in England 10 Anglo-Am. L. Rev. 241, 248 (1981). 
 48. Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, On Reading the Constitution 8 (1991). 
 49. Katharine T. Bartlett, Gender and Law: Theory, Doctrine, Commentary (2d. ed. 
1993). 
 50. Id. Feminists, advocates of the Multiculturalism, and liberal Afro-Americans 
oppose the cultural domination of European-origin male descendants. They are 
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supra note 48, at 19. 
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cultural pluralism, argue that immigrants and other minority groups in 
the state have experience and perspectives (“voices”) that differ from 
those of the majority and that this difference has an internal value that 
should be maintained. 
In conclusion, the recognition of the fundamental power of 
culture, its influence on the individual’s level of culpability, shaping of 
the individual’s identity, and the different meanings that the culture 
provides for its practices, constitute the basic premises to recognize 
“cultural defense.” Insofar as the burden of criminal responsibility is 
qualified by criminal culpability, the defendant’s cultural influences 
should be exposed in the criminal trial to the extent it bears on their 
culpability. Additional factors such as substantive equality, individual 
justice, and promotion of values—such as cultural pluralism and the 
right to culture in a multicultural liberal state—reinforce the main 
argument for considering cultural arguments in a criminal procedure. 
Such arguments should be considered, relying on the principle of 
culpability, to the extent that they are relevant, genuine, and true. 
This conclusion constitutes the foundation for the next chapter of 
this article that examines four legal models, each of which represents a 
different perception to recognizing a minority defendant’s cultural 
background during a criminal procedure. 
SECOND CHAPTER: LEGAL MODELS FOR THE RECOGNITION OF 
A DEFENDANT’S CULTURE DURING CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
1. The “Complete Cultural Defense Model” - Cultural 
Background as a New Independent Criminal Defense 
One possible way to recognize the defendant’s cultural 
background during criminal proceedings is through a new defense 
against criminal liability.	   In such a case, the defendant’s cultural 
background constitutes an independent formal defense that eventually 
may exempt the defendant from bearing criminal liability. This is a 
radical and especially far-reaching method, and as far as I could 
ascertain, is not recognized in different legal systems because of 
reasons detailed below. Nevertheless, this is an optional model for the 
recognition of the defendant’s culture, which has sometimes been 
offered but also criticized in legal literature. The model supports the 
creation of a new independent doctrine of “cultural defense” that 
constitutes an exemption for a defendant from criminal liability. 
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a. Arguments Against the Application of the Model of “Complete 
Cultural Defense” 
Reduction of Culpability Does Not Justify Acquittal on the Basis 
of Cultural Background. The purpose of “cultural defense” is to enable 
defendants to present their cultural background in the court so that the 
court can consider this background when determining criminal liability 
and/or punishment. Consideration of cultural background may lead to 
one of two conclusions, or both. Firstly, that the defendant did not 
know that his acts contravened the law. Secondly, that the defendant 
acted according to the dictates of cultural norms and values. 
In both of these situations, the defendant is less culpable than 
would ordinarily be the case.52 The defendant’s culpability is reduced, 
yet this does not mean that it is negated. This is the main reason for my 
opposition to the application of a model that recognizes cultural 
background as an independent criminal defense. Thus, so long as the 
defendant is in any way culpable, the accurate way to consider the 
defendant’s culture is through more moderate models. Whether any 
jurisdiction has completely exonerated a cultural minority defendant 
based on “cultural defense” as an independent defense is doubtful. 
However, some jurisdictions have used more moderate models. These 
models consider whether the defendant has diminished liability, due to 
the “cultural motive,” and the defendant’s culture constitutes special 
circumstances of the crime’s perpetration. If the defendant acted under 
conditions that warrant a criminal defense under the penal code, a 
variety of defenses are available to the defendant. I propose that in 
some cases, when the act was not committed under circumstances that 
warrant a criminal defense, the defendant can still claim mitigation of 
punishment due to the influence of culture on their acts. 
The Fact That Suitable Tools and Doctrines Already Exist in 
Criminal Law Does Not Necessitate the Creation of a Cultural 
Restriction. The need for “cultural defense” as an independent defense 
exists in those cases in which the defendant is completely devoid of 
any culpability and existing defenses will not relieve him of criminal 
liability—even if the defendant’s culture is taken into consideration. 
Does this exceptional situation justify the creation of a new separate 
formal defense? I believe that other tools exist to cope with such a 
case. 
One tool that the investigative body possesses in a case of this 
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sort is prosecutorial discretion. These types of cases can be concluded 
without any ongoing criminal proceedings in court if the prosecutor 
recommends closing the case on grounds of “lack of public interest” or 
“lack of guilt.” Another strategy that can be used when the prosecutor 
is impressed by the specific circumstances of the case and decides to 
charge the defendant with a lesser offence. An additional means 
involves the defendant’s confession as part of a plea bargain, which 
may lead to conviction for a lesser crime and/or a milder punishment, 
such as supervision by a probation officer or community service for the 
benefit of the public. A further method which can be used in “lighter” 
offences is to claim the offence was “de minimis:” an act of little 
significance. Thus, even in cases where cultural background should 
exempt the defendant from any culpability, there is no need to create a 
new independent doctrine of “cultural defense.” 
Ignorance of the Law Does Not Constitute an Excuse. One 
argument against “cultural defense” is the possibility that the cultural 
minority defendant could claim exemption from criminal liability 
because she performed the criminal act without knowing that the act 
was forbidden under the criminal code.53 However, a “cultural defense” 
does not only deal with the question of whether the defendant was 
aware of the law (because the assumption is that ignorance of the law 
does not constitute an excuse). Instead, the court focuses on 
ascertaining whether the defendant knew that their (criminal) act was 
forbidden, yet committed the act under the influence of cultural 
dictates, beliefs, customs and values that were instilled in their 
personality from early childhood. 
Practical Difficulties. Critics of “cultural defense” claim that even 
if the law’s recognition of “cultural defense” as an independent defense 
is justified, the application of the defense in practice is a task strewn 
with difficulties.54 
Firstly, because “culture” has various meanings, it is unclear how 
the term should be defined in applying “cultural defense” as an 
independent defense. Another issue arises in determining which 
                                                                                                       
 53. See Julia P. Sams, The Availability of the “Cultural Defense” as an Excuse for 
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cultures should enjoy this defense. Should the defense also be available 
to sub-cultures, religious groups, or mystic cults of various sorts? How 
can a boundary be drawn to determine those people for whom the 
defense should be available from those for whom the defense should 
not (because they are expected to adapt their behavior to societal 
norms)? How is it possible to distinguish immigrants who have 
assimilated within the majority culture from those who have not?55 
Another dilemma focuses on the difficulty in identifying the 
motive behind a criminal act.56 Moreover, it can be argued that those 
who support the creation of an independent “cultural defense” have not 
provided a basic criterion to distinguish which practices or type of 
practices should be covered by this defense. Questions like these make 
it problematic to apply the defense, and generate controversy 
concerning legal and moral definitions, applications, and principles. On 
the other hand, it can be argued that these cases occur rarely, and even 
then the court may obtain experts to clarify the lifestyle, values, and 
norms of the defendant’s cultural group. In this way, the court can use 
its discretion to decide whether or not to recognize the defendant’s 
culture in the specific circumstances of the case. 
Encouraging Violence Against Women: One of the criticisms 
against “cultural defense” is that it may encourage violence against 
women.57 If the courts recognize this defense, it may provide a kind of 
stamp of approval for acts of domestic violence that may be sanctioned 
by certain cultures. At least one commentator argues that”cultural 
defense” may worsen the state of the victims that the defense is 
supposed to protect.58 However, one problem with this argument is that 
the recognition of the defendant’s cultural background does not only 
relate to violence in the family; rather, it relates to a variety of crimes. 
Moreover, even if “cultural defense” does give a stamp of approval to 
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crimes of violence within the family, its application can be limited in 
those cases, especially in cases of severe violence. Secondly, in several 
verdicts, the defendants who pleaded “cultural defense” were actually 
women,59 so that even if it is accepted that the defense acts against the 
good of women victims, in other cases it benefits them, when they are 
the accused. 
The Need for Deterrence: It is claimed that recognition of the 
cultural background of a defendant belonging to a minority culture will 
undermine deterrence of others, who will not be deterred from 
performing the same or similar acts.60 Similarly, it may affect the 
defendant’s deterrence; if the defendant receives the message that the 
criminal act is “accepted” she may be encouraged to reoffend. This 
claim can be attacked by arguing that recidivism would be encouraged 
in any case where a defendant is acquitted due to circumstances of 
restricted criminal liability; “cultural defense” does not pose any 
unique risk. 
The need for deterrence is one consideration among a range of 
different considerations that must be weighed. Firstly, the particular 
community to which the defendant belongs can be deterred by 
guidance and education—not necessarily by punishment of the 
defendant. Secondly, there is only a slight probability that the 
defendant who committed an act as the result of a cultural dictate will 
again perform the same act after she was once pardoned.61 
Undermining the Doctrine of Equality: Critics argue that 
“cultural defense” undermines the doctrine of equality.62 Difficulties 
with the definition make the defense problematic because some 
cultural groups are allowed the defense, while other are not.63 The 
difficulty in creating these definitions means that adoption of “cultural 
defense” will undermine equality more than it will promote it because 
the basic principle of the doctrine stipulates that all men are equal 
before the law.64 This reasoning can be disputed, because the doctrine 
                                                                                                       
 59. Fischer, supra note 54, at 690-91. 
 60. Sacks, supra note 22, at 541. 
 61. For a comprehensive discussion on the validity of the deterrence rationale in 
punishment in cases of “cultural defense”, see Guy Ben-David, Cultural Background 
as a Mitigating Factor in Sentencing in the Federal Law of the United States, 47 Crim. 
L. Bull., no. 4, 543, 548 (2011). 
 62. Sacks, supra note 22, at 542-45. 
 63. Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the “Cultural 
Defense”, 17 Harv. Women’s L.J. 57, 62 (1994). 
 64. Sacks, supra note 22, at 542. Also, see the discussion in Chapter I, section (2) 
22 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2 
of equality will in this case prevent acting justly with the defendant. 
Moreover, equality is not blind; the fact that everyone is subject to the 
same laws is correct and desirable. However, the law cannot close its 
eyes and ignore minority cultures: the cultural values and norms to 
which members of each culture are committed are of importance. Blind 
application of the doctrine of equality may erode important principles 
of the criminal law, such as individual justice and the principle of 
culpability. 
The Application of “Cultural Defense” Would Create Different 
Standards for Different Groups.65 Critics argue that the defense would 
allow each sub-culture in a society to decide which standards it would 
obey and which it would ignore, and it would therefore undermine 
social order and even lead to anarchy. However, this assertion may be 
too far-reaching. It would be correct if the cultural restriction led to a 
sweeping unconditional pardon for all minority members. It is clear 
however, that there are conditions for the application of any criminal 
defense, so that any injury to particular public values or important 
public interests will not be excused. Moreover, the defense does not 
create new standards for behavior because these standards exist in any 
case by virtue of the cultural difference. The defense simply puts the 
criminal act in context based on the cultural difference. Furthermore, 
the conditions required for application of the defense in a given case 
may be tailored to prevent any harm to the public order or anarchy. 
Summary: Recognition of “cultural defense” as an independent 
defense involves many disputes and difficulties concerning definition, 
application, and legal and moral principles. Some of these difficulties 
can be overcome while others can be refuted. Beyond the difficulties in 
practical application that I have discussed, there is an additional 
disadvantage in accepting such a model: the risk of sliding into erosion 
and harm to the principles of criminal law. 
According to this model, it is sufficient to grant an exemption to 
the defendant from criminal liability if a cultural act is the result of a 
particular practice. This defense does not relate to a specific case, 
defendant, or specific circumstances. According to the model in 
question it is the culture that receives the stamp of “approval” of 
criminal law; the law actually exempts the culture more than it exempts 
the defendant standing trial. This point of view overlooks the grounds 
for recognizing such a defense—the essence of the “cultural defense” 
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centers around the cultural practice rather than the perpetrator. 
From all of the above, I conclude that the defendant’s cultural 
background should be recognized with the help of existing criminal 
law tools and doctrines, and does not require or justify the creation of a 
separate cultural defense. Such a creation which would be a radical 
model that is not generally known to be applied in any legal system—
for good reason. Therefore, I am inclined to reject said model, and 
think that it is incorrect and undesirable. 
2. The “Integrated Model” Integration of Cultural 
Arguments Within the Existing Criminal Defenses 
Another way to recognize the defendant’s culture in a criminal 
procedure is by integrating cultural arguments within the existing 
criminal defenses. 66  I have dubbed this model as the “integrated 
model.”67In this discussion, I relate the advantages and disadvantages 
of this model, comparing it to other models mentioned in this article. 
 
a. The Rationale for the “Integrated Model.” 
According to the above-mentioned model, a defendant who 
committed a criminal act under the influence of a particular culture is 
“protected” by a defense against criminal liability, if the necessary 
conditions for the defense are met. Recognizing the defendant’s culture 
at this stage involves an understanding of the case and its 
circumstances in the view of those who belong to that culture. This 
cultural information is essential, without which it would be impossible 
to attain suitable and just results. One example demonstrating the need 
for this model is as follows: as a Buddhist is praying to the statue of 
Buddha in a particular temple, an unidentified individual jumps into 
this sacred sanctuary with a hammer in his hand and marches towards 
the statue in order to smash it. In the split second when the hammer is 
raised above the statue of Buddha, the Buddhist, who worships the 
religious icon, pushes the would-be vandel aside and injures him. If the 
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Buddhist is tried for the attack, he should be able to argue “self-
defense” which will “provide a defense for the use of force to protect 
persons or property from unlawful aggression.”68 
Without the presentation of the defendant’s cultural background, 
the court will be unable to assign the appropriate extent of culpability 
because it will not be able to understand the motive for the act. In the 
given case, the court should be aware of the defendant’s cultural 
background in order to understand the link between the Buddhist 
defendant and the statue. If the court does not comprehend the “cultural 
motive,”the statue of Buddha will perhaps be considered simply as a 
statue like any other, or even like any other property generally. This 
will in turn influence the assessment of the defendant’s act and its 
proportions. In this case, the court is exposed to the defendant’s 
cultural background as part of an existing “self-defense” and will 
eventually decide whether or not to to apply self-defense to the 
defendant’s case. The court’s exposure to the defendant’s cultural 
background, when relevant, is necessary because it helps the court to 
understand and evaluate the true meaning of the defendant’s acts and 
whether any real alternatives were available to the defendant. 
Acceptance of a cultural argument is subject to the rules of evidence 
and the court weighs this argument according to its impressions of the 
truth and authenticity of this evidence. First, the court must “raise the 
cultural curtain” in order to expose the cultural argument with all its 
meanings. In order to do so, the court has to examine whether the 
necessary conditions for the defense exist from the subjective 
viewpoint of the defendant on trial. At the second stage, the court must 
assess the authenticity of the cultural argument, under the assumption 
that it is relevant and subject to the rules of of evidence. The court can 
decide not to attribute any weight to this argument because it did not 
consider the argument authentic, because the argument was not 
properly established, or because the argument was refuted by other 
evidence. 
 
b. The Advantages of the “Integrated Model.” 
Firstly, this model does not involve the creation of a new 
independent defense or the use of new tools in the criminal arena, and 
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it is applicable without the need for any special resources. 
Secondly, the framework of defenses against criminal liability is 
employed after the defendant has complied with the statutory 
conditions for the application of the defense. Thus, the defendant 
would be entitled to a defense because circumstances exist that create 
the exception and not by virtue of his membership in any particular 
minority culture. Thirdly, the message delivered by acquitting the 
defendant according to the “integrated” model differs from the 
message that might be understood under the “complete cultural 
defense” model. The foundation for acquittal according to the 
“complete cultural defense” model is the defendant’s culture. This is in 
contrast to acquittal under the “integrated” model, which relies on 
compliance with an existing criminal defense. If it is decided that the 
defendant acted under the circumstances of an accepted defense, the 
defendant’s acquittal will convey the message that the act committed is 
forbidden but in the unique situation that the defendant encountered, 
the acts are exempted by law. The fact that a particular defendant was 
acquitted does not suggest that there will be an acquittal in a similar 
case where another defendant committed the same crime. 
A fourth advantage lies in the very fact that this is a moderate 
model. The intergrated model represents the middle path: the 
recognition of the defendant’s cultural background to the extent that it 
is possible to exempt the defendant from criminal liability. On the one 
hand, it does not ignore the defendant’s cultural background, where 
this is a relevant datum for judging the criminal act. On the other hand, 
it does not recognize the defendant’s culture as the basis for an 
independent defense. 
The “punishment” model recognizes a defendant’s cultural 
background, but only at the stage of sentencing. Under the 
“punishment model,” a court treats the defendant’s background like 
any other datum that may mitigate punishment after a conviction. The 
defendant’s diminished culpability is expressed in a lighter sentence. 
However, sometimes the defendant has only a very low level of 
culpability such that it would be unjust to convict the defendant at all, 
even if the punishment is mitigated. Therefore, one of the advantages 
of the integrated model is that it allows the court to weigh the 
defendant’s cultural background even before sentencing. 
A fifth advantage for the “integrated” model is that it does not 
recognize harmful practices, just because the defendant acted under 
cultural dictates. The model does not accept cultural values and norms 
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that contradict the values and norms of the majority culture. Under the 
“integrated model,” a defendant who acted according to a particular 
cultural stipulation will not be exempt from criminal liability. In other 
words, any breach of norms, values and principles protected by 
criminal law will not be exempt unless the case falls under a generally 
applicable statutory defense. Furthermore, evidence of the minority 
culture influence on the defendant will only be allowed where the act 
was committed in circumstances that the law had from the outset 
decided it would exempt defendants in general. Thus, this model does 
not allow any injury to the rights and liberties of others on account of 
the principles, values, and morality of that minority culture. According 
to said model, there is no justification to recognize the practice of 
honor killing within the family as a defense against criminal 
responsibility in murder cases or any other ‘harmful’ practices which 
were not committed under conditions that permit an existing statutory 
defense. 
A sixth advantage of this model stems from the “de minimis” 
defense, which allows an exception for trivial offenses.69 In such 
circumstances, a court, considering the background of the cultural 
minority defendant, may exempt that defendant from liability for a 
relatively minor infraction. In cases such a Karger—where the cultural 
practice does not cause harm, infringe any human right, or injure the 
public interest—a court may dismiss the defendant’s acts as de 
minimus. The “de minimis” defense can actually constitute an 
independent cultural defense, but only in cases which do not provoke 
cultural or moral antagonism as in the case of Kargar.67  A further 
example relates to possession of a small amount of drugs, in cases 
where the defendant’s culture permits the use of the drug to heal 
certain illnesses. If the defendant can prove that they held the drug 
solely for medical purposes, in accordance with their cultural beliefs, 
then the case should be dismissed as de minimus. It is true that in such 
cases, the prohibited cultural practice would receive a seal of approval. 
                                                                                                       
 69. See Model Penal Code § 2.12 note (2010): “Section 2.12 authorizes the court to 
exercise a power inherent in other agencies of criminal justice to ignore merely 
technical violations of law. It directs the court to dismiss a prosecution if one of the 
three conditions exists: (1) the defendant’s conduct was within a customary license or 
tolerance; or (2) the defendant’s conduct neither caused nor threatened the harm sought 
to be prevented by the law defining the offense, or did so only to a trivial degree; or (3) 
the defendant’s conduct presents such other extenuations that it cannot reasonably be 
regarded as within the legislative prohibition.” 
67 679 A.2d 81 (Me. 1996). 
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However, this decision would only occur after a court has considered 
and balanced the entirety of the rights, principles, values, and interests 
involved. Thus, the “de minimis” defense, like the discretion of the 
prosecution not to try a case in the absence of public interest, both 
constitute appropriate filters to provide a defense against criminal 
liability. 
 
c. The Disadvantages of Recognizing the Defendant’s Culture 
Within the “Integrated Model.” 
One disadvantage is that the model enables the judges to apply 
broad discretion in order to dismiss cultural arguments; an independent 
defense would require a court to devote independent discussion to such 
arguments. For instance, while one judge would agree to recognize a 
particular act as falling within the boundaries of the “de minimis” 
defense, another judge with a different opinion might think otherwise. 
To summarize, the “integrated model” is a moderate model that 
considers the defendant’s cultural background to allow the defendant to 
explain her actions in the context of the specific circumstances within 
which she acted—but only when the acts are linked with the 
defendant’s cultural background and are committed under conditions 
that meet an existing defense. This is a moderate model because it only 
considers the defendant’s cultural background if the case falls within a 
situation in which the legislator would anyway exempt the defendant 
from criminal liability. This model is not fraught with the practical 
difficulties of creating a new criminal defense, and does not engender 
legal, moral, or ethical antagonism as would the “complete cultural 
defense” model. 
Within the framework of the next model, I discuss the 
defendant’s cultural background as an issue to be considered for 
mitigation of punishment. 
3. “The Punishment Model” - Recognition of the Defendant’s 
Cultural Background as a Mitigating Factor in Sentencing 
Punishment is an essential concept in criminal law. The 
punishment model recognizes the defendant’s culture as a mitigating 
factor in sentencing.70 Prima facie, the punishment model of “cultural 
                                                                                                       
 70. For a comprehensive discussion on the punishment model, see Ben-David, 
supra note 61. 
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defense” appears to strike the correct balance between different 
interests. The model does not exempt the defendant from criminal 
liability, but it recognizes the cultural argument to the extent that it is 
genuine and relevant. The model then translates this recognition into 
mitigation of the type or extent of punishment. 
According to the “punishment model,” the defendant’s cultural 
background is recognized in order to mitigate a punishment 
irrespective of the framework of criminal liability. Factually, the 
defendant has already been convicted of the crimes attributed to him; 
this is so regardless of whether he defended himself by means of 
cultural arguments and those arguments were rejected, or whether such 
arguments were not voiced at the trial stage. In the punishment model, 
the defendant may present evidence to be considered in determining his 
punishment, and to establish the authenticity of the “cultural motive” 
by virtue of which the crime was committed. The goal at this stage of 
the criminal procedure is to prove to the court that the defendant’s 
extent of culpability was diminished as a result of the cultural 
background to which the defendant belongs, thus entitling the 
defendant to a mitigation of punishment. 
 
a. The Advantages of Recognizing the Defendant’s Cultural 
Background at the Sentencing Stage. 
The message delivered by recognizing the defendant’s culture 
according to the punishment model is that the criminal act was 
forbidden, and that any defendant who breaches the law is liable for 
sanctions without distinction and without any connection to the culture 
to which they belong. The message is sharp and clear: a defendant who 
belongs to a specific minority culture and commits a criminal act in the 
context of his culture cannot be exempt from criminal liability (under 
the assumption that he did not commit the act in circumstances 
recognized under an existing formal defense). The message transmitted 
to the public at large—and specifically to the defendant’s cultural 
community— is that everyone is equal before the law and there is no 
pardon for a defendant who violates the law, even if they acted in 
accordance with norms, values, or dictates of their cultural community. 
Recognition of the defendant’s cultural background as a new 
complete defense or by integrating cultural arguments into existing 
formal defenses leads to a dichotomy, expressed by the alternatives of 
conviction or acquittal. Contrastingly, considering culture at the 
sentencing stage enables the judge to assign the appropriate type and 
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extent of punishment for the defendant, in accordance with the extent 
of her culpability. Further, culture is only considered insofar as the 
enculturation process influenced the defendant’s behavior, values, and 
personality. Thus, considering the defendant’s culture at this stage 
enables the court to choose a solution along a continuum of increasing 
severity, allowing the court discretion for a broad array of actions.71 
When determining punishment, the judge is entitled to weigh different 
rationales for punishment (such as retribution, rehabilitation, 
incapacitation and deterrence) while considering their validity for the 
specific case. In this way, the judge is faithful to competing interests 
such as the extent of harm to the victim, the promotion of cultural 
pluralism in criminal law, and allowing the expression of “the right to 
culture.” 
It is also possible to argue that recognition of the defendant’s 
culture at the sentencing stage does not necessitate legislation or any 
additional resources in order to apply said model. Additionally, this 
model may make it unnecessary to raise cultural arguments at earlier 
stages of the criminal procedure, thus streamlining the trial and 
preventing any unecessary complication and lengthening of the 
process. 
 
b. Critique of Considering Culture at the Sentencing Stage. 
First, the critique that is voiced against recognizing cultural 
background at any stage of the criminal procedure is equally valid at 
the sentencing stage. This critique is that by recognizing cultural 
background in the criminal process, it disseminates a public message 
that members of minority cultures are entitled to “privileged 
consideration” and in fact are not subject to the same standards as the 
rest of society’s citizens.72 
Secondly, the defendant’s request that the court consider her 
culture may be viewed as an unjustifiable request to excuse her violent 
act merely because it is accepted in her cultural community.73 In doing 
                                                                                                       
 71. Gabriel Halevi, The Impact of Defense Arguments Based on the Cultural 
Difference of the Accused in the Criminal Law of Immigrant Countries and Societies, 
51 J. Migration & Refugee 13 (2009). 
 72. See Kelly Diffily, Comment, Protecting the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A 
Look at Congress’ Prohibition of Cultural Differences in Federal Sentencing 
Determinations in the Wake of the 2003 Protect Act, 78 Temp. L. Rev. 255 ,283  
(2005). 
 73. Id. 
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so, the court disregards the liberties and rights of the victims, 
especially women and children, who commonly migrate to the country 
in order to enjoy those rights and liberties which could not be enjoyed 
by them in their countries of origin. Further, mitigation of punishment 
may perpetuate the message that the victims of the crime have no 
suitable representation in court, thus strengthening their sense of 
victimization. 
Another argument revolves around the fact that the request for 
consideration of cultural background as part of sentencing 
determination has often been raised by women defendants. The 
argument is that if women ask the court to consider their cultural 
background when they are accused of committing particular crimes, 
then a man belonging to the same culture can similarly claim that his 
culture allows him to engage in violent domestic behavior.74 
Several arguments can be presented to counter these critiques. 
First, even if the cultural argument is recognized at the sentencing 
stage, the court must still balance the cultural claim against other 
important interests, including the victims’ interest not to be harmed. 
Further, it may be argued that the punishment model does not engage 
in impermissible discrimination, but rather promotes a permissible 
distinction. This is because the distinction is based on differing 
relevant characteristics (for the determination of punishment) between 
defendants belonging to the majority culture and defendants belonging 
to minority cultures. Insofar as the extent of culpability is a 
substantive—but not an exclusive—factor in determining punishment, 
then considering the defendant’s cultural background to the extent it 
influenced the defendant’s culpability, is not impermissibly 
discriminatory. 
Thus, in contrast to the recognition of a defendant’s culture as an 
independent new defense (the “complete cultural defense model”) or 
the integration of a defendant’s cultural background as part of the 
components of an existing defense (the “integrated model”), 
recognition of cultural arguments at the sentencing stage has an 
important and principled advantage. While the two previously 
mentioned models are instrumental in determining a choice between 
acquittal and conviction, at the sentencing stage the judge has the 
discretion to impose a particular punishment from a graded continuum 
of punishments. This means the judge can impose the punishment that 
                                                                                                       
 74. Id. 
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is most fitting for the specific case. The appropriate punishment is the 
result of weighing the entirety of the data and interests involved in the 
case, while adapting the punishment to the specific defendant on trial. 
The advantage of the consideration of culture at the sentencing 
stage is due to the flexibility of the punishment, which reflects the 
flexibility of a legal system committed to ensuring individual 
consideration and personal justice towards a particular defendant. This 
flexibility enables the court to assign greater weight to the cultural 
background in one case and lesser weight to this factor in another case, 
and in both cases the results will be seen as appropriate and just. Any 
cultural practice or criminal act peformed should be distinguished 
according to the court’s discretion. while considering the message that 
will be conveyed as a result of the type and extent of the punishment 
imposed. Mitigation of punishment where the defendant possesses 
drugs under cultural belief that the drug has medical powers, does not 
justify mitigation of punishment for a defendant belonging to the same 
culture who advocates female circumcision. The court’s discretion 
depends, as always, on the severity of the offense, its unique 
circumstances, the defendant’s motive, and other relevant factors 
which allow the court to distinguish between cases. The range of 
discretion open to the court allows it to accept some practices and to 
give them significant expression by substantially mitigating the extent 
of punishment, while it also allows the court to reject a cultural 
argument or give it little weight in other cases. 
So that the court can assign the correct weight to cultural 
background and the extent of its influence on the defendant’s behavior, 
evidence of this background should be presented to the court. One way 
to do this is to allow the defendant to introduce authoritative witnesses 
regarding the cultural practices, who can clarify the defendant’s 
culture. Another method would be to ask the probation service to 
prepare a report including consideration of the defendant’s cultural 
background. It is also possible to anchor the method for presentation of 
such evidence in the law, such as a sentencing guideline that would 
mandate consideration of the defendant’s cultural background, if 
relevant, when determining the verdict. 
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4. The “Disregarding Model” – Lack of Consideration of the 
Defendant’s Cultural Background in a Criminal Procedure 
Several scholars oppose cultural defenses in regardless of form.75 
I will call this approach the “disregarding model.” Within the 
description of the complete cultural defense model,” I noted several 
arguments against the application of a cultural defense. These 
arguments constitute the foundation and justification for the 
“disregarding model”. The consequence of adopting the “disregarding 
model” is that no evidence regarding the defendant’s cultural 
background is admissible during the criminal procedure because this is 
considered irrelevant to the determination of culpability or punishment. 
THIRD CHAPTER: THE PROPOSED SOLUTION – THE “RELATIVE 
NORMATIVE MODEL” 
Each of the four models described in this paper presents a 
different way to relate to the defendant’s cultural background, and each 
model has its advantages and disadvantages. I am led to the conclusion, 
therefore, that the solution does not lie in the strict application of one 
particular model, but rather in the creation of a “mixed” model that 
constitutes a synthesis of the following three models: the “integrated 
model,” the “punishment model,” and the “disregarding model.” I dub 
this model as the “relative normative model,” because it involves the 
varying application of each of the above-mentioned three models, 
while the basic assumption is established on a foundation of normative 
assumptions. Because this is a relative normative model, any society 
and any legal system can adapt this model to its system, drawing their 
own normative boundaries for the application of the model. 
1. The Rationale for the Creation of the “Relative Normative 
Model” 
The suggested model asserts that there is not, and it is not proper 
that there should be, a single inflexible model or rule concerning the 
recognition of a defendant’s cultural background by a legal system 
during a criminal procedure. To prove the validity of this argument I 
                                                                                                       
 75. Elizabeth Martin, Note, All Men Are (or Should Be) Created Equal: An 
Argument Against the Use of the Cultural Defense in a Post-Booker World, 15 Wm. & 
Mary Bill Rts. J. 1305 (2007);. Lyman, supra note 53, at 108-09; Sams, supra note 53, 
at 337; Fischer, supra note 54, at 688; Sacks, supra note 22, at 550; Goldstein, supra 
note 55, at 147-48; Spatz, supra note 57, at 626. 
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shall ground it on two radical events: The first is an act of murder 
committed against a background of transgression of the family honor 
code,76 and the second is a cultural practice such as the one previously 
described in the Kargar case. 
Our moral intuition calls for the censure and denunciation of 
murder in any form, even when a murder is committed in observance 
of family honor codes common in some cultures. However, 
considering the defendant’s cultural background in Kargar, the 
conduct in that case—although generally undesirable—seems 
forgiveable. The source of the different ethical, moral, and legal 
considerations lies in the distinction between the two acts—a severe 
homicidal act to uphold the value of honor, causing the death of the 
victim, as opposed to an act of “little significance” termed as a sexual 
assault in legal language. The distinction between these two contrasting 
cases speaks to many more such cases on both sides, yet it also speaks 
to the existence of many cases that exist in the middle of these two 
extremes. The need to draw such a distinction between different cases 
and defendants necessitates the adoption of a flexible model by the 
courts. A method that can be applied to appropriately reflect the proper 
balance between the rights, principles, and interests involved in the 
unique circumstances of each case. 
2. Outlining the Court’s Discretion in Applying the “Relative 
Normative Model” 
The question for discussion is which of the three models should 
the court apply in the case brought before it? To answer this question, I 
draw distinctions among the “integrated model,” the “punishment 
model,” and the “disregarding model.” The first two models are 
“positive” models because they both allow for recognition of the 
defendant’s cultural background. While the “integrated model” allows 
consideration of this data when criminal liability is determined, the 
“punishment model” allows this at a later stage: during sentencing. In 
contrast, the “disregarding model” is a “negative” model that does not 
allow any consideration of the defendant’s cultural background at any 
stage of the criminal procedure. In the following discussion I shall 
                                                                                                       
 76. For a comprehensive discussions on Honor Killing, see Wendy M. Gonzalez, 
Karo Kari: Honor Killing, 9 Buff. Women’s L.J. 22 (2000/2001); Rachel A. Ruane, 
Comment, Murder in the Name of Honor: Violence Against Women in Jordan and 
Pakistan, 14 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 1523 (2000); John Alan Cohan, Honor Killings and 
the Cultural Defense, 40 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 177 (2010). 
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indicate the stages where the application of the “relative normative 
model” is desirable. 
 
a. The Mode of Application for the “Relative Normative Model.” 
At the first stage a court should ask whether, in the defendant’s 
view, the defendant’s acts were committed under the conditions of an 
existing defense against criminal liability. If it was, then the case 
should be treated according to the “integrated model.” The defendant 
should be allowed to present her cultural background, so that the court 
can examine the authenticity of this argument on the basis of evidence 
that can reinforce and affirm the argument. The defendant’s arguments 
must comply with some or all of the statutory conditions for the 
application of the defense, while the court examines the act and its 
circumstances from the viewpoint of the member of the minority 
group. If the court is convinced that the defendant did indeed act under 
the conditions of the defense, then the defendant will be exempt from 
criminal liability. If the defendant does not argue that their act was 
conducted under the conditions of a particular defense, then the 
criminal act committed by the defendant must be examined according 
to several parameters detailed below. If a positive answer is given to 
one or more of these parameters, then the “disregarding model” should 
be applied. 
At the second stage, if a defendant has not argued that the act was 
committed under the conditions of a particular defense, it is necessary 
to ask whether the crime is a homicide. If so, the case should be 
channeled to the “disregarding model.” Recognition of the defendant’s 
cultural background will not apply in cases of homicide. This rule 
reinforces the principle of the sanctity of human life found in many 
legal system. Because homicide cases such as “honor killings” or cases 
of “infanticide” cannot be considered for mitigation of culpability or 
punishment, the rule sends a clear message that no cultural value, 
however important, can outweigh the sanctity of human life. 
In fact, as part of this stage, any society is entitled to set a “red 
line” to determine in which criminal cases it will not recognize the 
defendant’s culture, and to channel these cases to the “disregarding 
model.” For example, a State legislature may determine that the 
“disregarding model” should also apply in cases involving certain 
severe crimes of violence.  On the other hand, the same legislature may 
determine that only a homicide committed with the mental element of 
“intent” should be channeled to the “disregarding” model, while other 
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homicidal acts committed under “milder” mental states (such as 
recklessness) should be channeled to the “punishment” model. 
These rules so far seem out of line with the first part of this article 
regarding the justification for recognizing a defendant’s culture in a 
criminal trial. It was argued that when a defendant acted under a 
specific cultural dictate, it should be grounds for diminished 
responsibility. However, according to the proposed new model it is 
suggested that no such special consideration should be given in cases 
of homicide or a severe violent crime, even if the perpetrator acted 
according to a specific cultural dictate. The answer is that this is where 
expression is given to the necessary normative balance between 
“tolerable” cultural dictates—that are exempted criminal liability or 
mitigated in sentencing—versus “harmful” cultural dictates which 
cannot be tolerated in a democratic society. 
At the third stage, if the defendant does not claim that the act was 
conducted under conditions of a particular defense and if the case is not 
one of homicide, then the case should be channeled to the “punishment 
model.” Within the framework of the “punishment model” a court 
should examine the several following parameters that can assist it in 
correctly evaluating the defendant’s culpability. 
 
b. The Parameters that can Assist the Court in Evaluating the 
Defendant’s Culpability. 
The extent of the defendant’s assimilation within the majority 
culture may assist in evaluating culpability. A cultural minority 
defendant’s knowledge of majority culture may be assessed through 
the following non-exclusive factors: (1) the defendant’s period of 
residence in the state (2) the language that she speaks (3) external 
signs, such as dress and behavior (4) the place where the defendant was 
educated (5) the defendant’s occupation (6) whether the defendant was 
in contact with government bodies such as welfare, nursing, health 
authorities, etc. and (7) the defendant’s natural environment. 
A new immigrant who arrived in the host country and soon 
afterwards performed a cultural practice that constitutes a criminal act 
should be distinguished from a person who lived in the host country for 
many years prior to committing the crime. Similarly, with regard to the 
argument of “ignorance of the law,” there is a difference between a 
new immigrant and someone who has lived in the country for many 
years. The fact that a new immigrant does not speak the local language 
hinders effective interaction with neighbors who do in fact speak the 
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local language. A person who does not speak the state’s official 
language cannot be presumed to have assimilated within the majority 
culture.  For example, people who live for many years in the 
Chinatown region of New York City live in a Chinese community, are 
surrounded by people speaking Chinese, and work in an area where 
almost everyone is Chinese; there is no need for these people to speak 
any other language, and so they do not. Such persons cannot be 
considered to have assimilated within the American majority culture. 
Thus, they will have diminished culpability when they perform crimes 
dictated by Chinese culture in comparison to people who are fully 
assimilated within the majority culture. Finally, the defendant’s 
occupation, the place where she acquired her education, and her close 
environment can testify to the extent of her exposure to, and 
assimilation with, the majority culture. 
Under an additional parameter, it is necessary to ask whether the 
criminal act that the defendant performed has an “additional cultural 
value.” This parameter aims to measure how positive the act is in the 
eyes of the cultural community to which the defendant belongs. A good 
example of this is the case in which a defendant possessed drugs 
known to have special medical powers and held them with the 
intention of curing an illness or medical symptom. 
Another parameter which may indicate the extent of the 
defendant’s culpability is the extent the defendant’s arguments are 
supported by expert evidence. The fact that the defendant’s arguments 
are supported by expert witnesses (sociologists, anthropologists, etc.) 
grants those arguments a dimension of authenticity. 
The court is also entitled to examine whether or not the victim 
belongs to the defendant’s culture and whether the victim of the crime 
agreed to the performance of the crime. In some cases, the victim of 
the defendant’s crime will belong to the same culture as the defendant. 
In such cases, if the victim being of the same culture of the defendant, 
willingly and freely consents to the performance of the crime, then the 
defendant’s culpability is less than in another case where the victim did 
not consent to the performance of the crime. 
Yet another parameter examines whether there was a process of 
conciliation-mediation-compensation between the victim of the crime 
and the defendant. An example is the “soulha” process accepted in 
traditional Arab cultures. In his article “It is about time for a Soulha,” 
Israeli Justice Ron Shapira notes that the “soulha” is not just an 
agreement or mediation process between the person harmed by the 
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crime and the perpetrator.76 The “soulha” is a traditional institution for 
the settlement of disputes in Arab society.77 It constitutes an expression 
of the main phenomenon that characterizes the development of the 
legal system, including the Israeli legal system, that is, the evolution of 
alternative procedures for the settling of disputes outside the courts 
system (alternative dispute resolution).78 
The criminal mediation process is based on the amelioration of 
the relationship between the victim and the person who harmed them, 
where the substance of the mediation is to mend the relations between 
the victim and the perpetrator.79 This theory, known as the “Theory of 
Ameliorative Justice,” views the injury to the victim, and the victim’s 
community, as the focus of the criminal incident. This contrasts with 
the traditional perception of criminal law that focuses on the injury to 
the law and the general interest of the public that stems from the 
criminal act. 80  Under Shapira’s approach, several factors justify 
recognizing the practice of “soulha” when considering culpability. 
These include the development of criminal law, the wishes of the 
victim, the importance of compensating the victim, and the mediation 
process between the injured person and the offender.81 I am convinced 
that “soulha” constitutes a relevant consideration when determining 
punishment, though it should be subordinate to the specific 
circumstances and other considerations for punishment. 
A court may consider other aspects to bear on culpability. For 
example, consideration may be given to whether the cultural 
community will impose sanctions on the defendant and similarly, 
whether the defendant’s cultural community will act to prevent the 
repetition of such cases. A court should consider additional questions 
to clarify the proper extent of consideration, if at all, of the defendant’s 
cultural background. It is noted that this proposed list of parameters for 
consideration is an “open” list because there may be other useful 
parameters for evaluation of the defendant’s extent of culpability. 
Some of these parameters can also be used or given extra weight to 
evaluate the defendant’s culpability and the authenticity of her cultural 
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arguments within the “integrated” model. 
SUMMARY 
In the first chapter of this article I discussed the justifications for 
the recognition of a “cultural defense” doctrine in criminal procedure. 
The conclusion from this part of the article led me to discuss whether it 
is proper to recognize the defendant’s cultural background during a 
criminal procedure and how t§his should be done. In response to this 
question I suggested four legal models, where each model described 
and reflected different consideration and levels of recognition for the 
defendant’s cultural background during criminal procedure. 
While the “complete cultural defense model” advocates the 
creation of a new cultural defense against criminal liability, the 
“integrated model” supports the integration of cultural arguments 
within existing defenses. The “punishment model” recognizes cultural 
arguments as a mitigating factor in sentencing. In contrast to these 
three models, the “disregarding model” reflects a different approach 
that views the defendant’s culture as an irrelevant datum in criminal 
procedure, and does not give it any consideration. Each model involves 
advantages and disadvantages in comparison with the other models. 
The fact that each model may be suitable for particular cases and 
certain circumstances led me to conclude that the solution to the 
underlying issue of the thesis cannot be found in the strict application 
of one of these models for all cases of “cultural defense.” Rather, the 
solution can perversely be found in the appropriate application of each 
of the suggested models. I therefore reject the preference of one model 
over other models, and propose that a synthesis of the several models 
be used. I dubbed this scheme the “relative normative model.” 
According to this model, the advantages and disadvantages of each 
model are weighed and one of the models is chosen to be applied as is 
appropriate for a particular case brought before the court. Since a 
suitable solution for the thesis must be founded on normative 
consideration, I think it is appropriate that the “relative normative 
model” should not include the “complete cultural defense.” It appears 
that the application of this model would undermine liberal norms, 
values and principles and lead to a slide down a sharp slope which 
might destabilize important liberal values in a society that advocates 
the protection of human rights. Nevertheless, it is quite conceivable 
that different legal systems will choose to adopt the “relative normative 
model” within which, when the crime was committed in the setting of 
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particular circumstances, it will be possible to channel the case brought 
before the court to a “complete cultural defense.” 
As noted, the “relative normative” model combines three models, 
each of which offers a different approach to the issue of recognition of 
a defendant’s cultural background in the criminal procedure. Those 
approaches ranged from complete disregard for the defendant’s culture, 
to considering culture as a mitigating factor in sentencing, and ending 
with the integration of cultural arguments within the framework of 
existing defenses. The difference between these approaches 
necessitates the determination of guidelines that would channel each 
particular case to one of the suggested models. The court should apply 
the “relative normative model” for any case in which the issue of 
“cultural defense” arises. One of the advantages of this model is its 
flexibility and ability to be adapted for any society, any legal system, 
or any time. 
In order to facilitate the application of said model, several 
parameters were suggested in order to construct the court’s discretion 
and to assist the court in finding the solution for the particular case. 
This is an open list of criteria, and the court is entitled to add additional 
criteria in order to draw a balance between them or to assign a special 
weight to some of them. 
The discussion of “cultural defense” first arose in the United 
States for debate in literature and litigation during the 1980s. Since that 
time, the issue has been widely discussed. However, deciding on the 
legal regulation of this issue raises legal, moral, and pragmatic 
difficulties. This article has discussed some of the dilemmas that 
“cultural defense” involves and even suggested pragmatic solutions for 
these dilemmas. 
	  
